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not deter mitigation of loss and would prevent the lender from making a

supernormal profit while others go unpaid. North Carolina can go one
step further and reduce the number of loan misappropriation cases
without unduly burdening lenders by granting equitable liens to general
contractors who relied on construction loan funds but were not paid for

completed work.
WILLIAm

H.

HIGGINS

Consumer Protection-Hardy v. Toler: Applying the North
Carolina Deceptive Trade Practices Legislation-What Role for

the Jury?
Shortly after the enactment of the North Carolina unfair trade

practices legislation in 1969,1 the hope was expressed that the state had
taken a "unique approach" to consumer protection that might well
succeed in curbing deceptive trade practices: a consumer protection statute to be enforced in large part by consumers themselves. 2 For
almost six years, however, the potential of these sections had remained
1. The main provisions of the legislation are to be found in the newly created
section 75-1.1 which provides as follows:
Methods of competition, acts and practices regulated; legislative policy.-(a) Unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce are hereby declared unlawful.
(b) The purpose of this section is to declare, and to provide civil legal
means to maintain, ethical standards of dealings between persons engaged in
business, and between persons engaged in business and the consuming public
within this State, to the end that good faith and fair dealings between buyers
and sellers at all levels of commerce be had in this State.
(c) Nothing in this section shall apply to acts done by the publisher,
owner, agent or employee of a newspaper, periodical or radio or television station, or other advertising medium in the publication or dissemination of an advertisement, when the owner, agent, or employee did not have knowledge of
the false, misleading or deceptive character of the advertisement and when the
newspaper, periodical or radio or television station, or other advertising medium did not have a direct financial interest in the sale or distribution of the
advertised product or service.
(d) Any party claiming to be exempt from the provisions of this section
shall have the burden of proof with respect to such claim.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-1.1 (1975). In addition, the following sections were amended
to make them applicable to all potential defendants in a deceptive trade practice action:
id. §§ 75-9, -10, -11, -12, -16 (1975).
2. See Comment, Consumer Protection and Unfair Competition in North Carolina-The 1969 Legislation, 48 N.C.L. REv. 896, 911 (1970) [hereinafter cited as
Comment].
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untested. 3 Finally, in Hardy v. Toler' the North Carolina Supreme
Court was squarely confronted with the case that necessitated an initial
judicial construction of the statute. Although in Hardy defendant's
actions were held to violate section 75-1.1 of the North Carolina
General Statutes, 5 the court may well have vitiated the impact of these
provisions by its apparent ruling on the critical question whether it is
for the judge or the jury to decide if alleged conduct constitutes an unfair or deceptive trade practice. 6 If Hardy is to be read as requiring a
determination of liability under the statute by the court alone, the cor-

responding lack of significant jury involvement could effectively deprive the legislation of much of its consumer orientation.
In 1971 plaintiff Hardy purchased a used car from defendants,
relying on representations that it was a low mileage, previously
unwrecked, one-owner vehicle carrying a transferable manufacturer's
warranty.7 Upon learning that in fact these representations were
untrue, and known by defendants to be false, plaintiff brought suit in
Craven County Superior Court seeking damages for breach of warranty,

punitive damages, and treble damages under section 75-16 of the General Statutes, 8 alleging that defendant's actions amounted to unfair
or deceptive trade practices under section 75-1.1.9 The trial court
granted defendant's motion for a directed verdict on the question of
punitive damages and refused to allow the jury to determine whether
defendant's conduct was indeed unfair or deceptive within the statute. 10

After a jury verdict for plaintiff for breach of warranties, the judge
refused to treble the award, holding as a matter of law that "the acts
3. In no previous case had liability been found under section 75-1.1, and in only
three appellate opinions had the section even been noted: Harrington Mfg. Co. v.
Powell Mfg. Co., 26 N.C. App. 414, 216 S.E.2d 379 (1975); Smith v. Ford Motor Co.,
26 N.C. App. 181, 215 S.E.2d 376 (1975); State v. Dare to be Great, Inc., 15 N.C.
App. 275, 189 S.E.2d 802 (1972).
4. 288 N.C. 303, 218 S.E.2d 342 (1975).
5. Id. at 311, 218 S.E.2d at 347.
6. Id. at 310, 218 S.E.2d at 346-47.
7. Id. at 305-06, 218 S.E.2d at 344.
8. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-16 (1975) provides:
Civil action by person injured; treble damages.-If any person shall be
injured or the business of any person, firm or corporation shall be broken up,
destroyed or injured by reason of any act or thing done by any other person,
firm or corporation in violation of the provisions of this Chapter, such person,
firm or corporation so injured shall have a right of action on account of such
injury done, and if damages are assessed by a jury in such case judgment shall
be rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant for treble the
amount fixed by the verdict.
9. 28 N.C. at 304-05, 218 S.E.2d at 343-44.
10. Id. at 305, 218 S.E.2d at 344.
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of the defendants did not constitute unfair or deceptive acts or practices
in the conduct of trade or commerce, which are declared unlawful by
Section 75-1.1 (a) . . .,,
The court of appeals upheld the trial court on the issue of punitive
damages, but remanded the case for a new trial on the ground that the
issue of deceptive trade practices should have been presented to the
jury. 1 2 The supreme court granted certiorari's to review the denial of
punitive damages, and presumably to address the question of the allocation of the decision-making responsibility between judge and jury as

to what constitutes an unfair trade practice. 14
After somewhat summarily disposing of plaintiffs claim for

punitive damages' 5 the court turned to the critical judge/jury issue.
Reviewing federal court decisions interpreting the provisions of the
Federal Trade Commission Act,1 6 and language from two Massachu-

setts opinions discussing a similar statute, 1 7 the North Carolina Supreme
Court declared that "traditionally" and "[o]rdinarily it would be for the
jury to determine the facts, and based on the jury's finding, the court
11. Record at 41, Hardy v. Toler, 288 N.C. 303, 218 S.E.2d 342 (1975).
12. 24 N.C. App. 625, 630-31, 211 S.E.2d 809, 813 (1975).
13. 287 N.C. 259, 214 S.E.2d 431 (1975).
14. Although in his petition for certiorari plaintiff raised only the question of punitive damages, Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari at 4-5, the Attorney General asked the
court to resolve the conflict which had developed in the courts below on the judge/jury
issue. Brief for Attorney General as Amicus Curiae at 2-4.
15. The entire court treated the question of punitive damages as though raised in
an action alleging common law fraud. Whereas the majority insisted that punitive damages were not warranted because plaintiff had failed to demonstrate "insult, indignity,
malice, oppression or bad motive other than .the same false representations" upon which
his claim was based, 288 N.C. at 306, 218 S.E.2d at 344-45, the concurring Justices contended that, even under the rigorous standard of the majority, defendant's conduct called
for the imposition of punitive damages. Id. at 312, 218 S.E.2d at 348. However, because the treble damages provision was thought to supersede any other recovery of punitive damages, the concurring Justices joined with the majority in ordering that plaintiff's
judgment be trebled.
If, however, proof of fraudulent intent is not a requisite element of plaintiffs case
under this new statutory scheme, neither the majority nor the concurring opinion seems
particularly well founded. Not only is the majority's premise for denying punitive damages severely eroded; the concurring Justices' interpretation of legislative intent in providing for treble damages also becomes suspect, since in fact "oppressive" conduct need
not be shown to establish recovery under the statute. The legislature may rather have
intended that treble damages finance litigation costs or represent unprovable actual damages, leaving the availability of punitive damages for "willful" conduct undisturbed.
Thus, in an appropriate case both treble and punitive damages could be awarded.
16. Federal Trade Commission Act § 5(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (1970). See
note 28 infra for the language of this federal statute. See note 35 infra for the case
cited by the court.
17. Mss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 93A, § 2 (1975). See cases cited notes 49-50
infra.
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would then determine as a matter of law whether the defendant
engaged in unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of trade
or commerce.' 18 But given the facts as stipulated by defendant in
Hardy,'9 the court concluded that there simply was never even a questionable role for a jury to have assumed: clearly section 75-1.1 had
been violated. The court held that such obviously unfair and deceptive
conduct must always be found to offend concepts of fairness and good
faith. 20 Therefore, the trial judge should have directed a verdict
against defendant as a matter of law and awarded treble damages
pursuant to section 75-16.21 With these instructions, the case was
22
remanded to the trial court to enter judgment for the plaintiff.
Prior to the passage of section 75-1.1 of the General Statutes, the
North Carolina consumer had been virtually without any meaningful
protection against, or remedy for, many unfair and deceptive trade
practices. This section was enacted by the legislature in part "to
declare, and to provide civil legal means to maintain, ethical standards
of dealings . . . between persons engaged in business and the consuming public within this State, to the end that good faith and fair dealings
between buyers and sellers at all levels of commerce be had in this
State. 23 Perhaps recognizing that "[it is impossible to frame definitions which embrace all unfair practices, '24 the legislature sought to
provide for a flexible maximum of deterrence and compensation.
Thus, in broadly declaring "unfair or deceptive acts or practices" unlawful, 25 the legislature chose not to attempt to enumerate specific
prohibited conduct, 20 but rather to delegate to the judicial process the
18. 288 N.C. at 310, 218 S.E.2d at 346-47.
19. Defendant admitted that at the time of the sale to plaintiff Hardy the odometer
showed mileage of at mest 23,000 miles, well under actual mileage of almost 80,000
miles, that it, defendant, knew at that time that the car had been sold twice previously
and that therefore its representations as to the transferability of warranties were false,
and that it had knowingly failed to disclose to plaintiff that the automobile had been
involved in a wreck. Id. at 310-11, 218 S.E:2d at 347.
20. Id. at 311, 218 S.E.2d at 347.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-1.1(b) (1975).
24. Although the words are those of tue United States Congress explaining its reluctance to enumerate specific standards in the Federal Trade Commission Act, H.R.
REP. No. 1142, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1914), the North Carolina legislature must have
appreciated the futility of any attempt to list all proscribed activities. See Comment,
supra note 2.
25. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-1.1(a) (1975).
26. See note 24 supra. THE UNroRm DECEPTrVE TADE PRAcTcns AcT, §§ 2(a)
(1)-(12), and the UNioRM CONSUMER SALES PRAcrTcEs AcT, §§ 3(b)(1)-(11), do pro-
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responsibility for determining on a case by case basis whether in fact
a breach of "good faith and fair dealings" had occurred.27 Until Hardy
v. Toler, however, the potential scope of section 75-1.1 'had not been
explored.
Because the language of section 75-1.1 was drawn almost verbatim
from the Federal Trade Commission Act,28 it was reasonable to suggest
that the North Carolina courts turn to the federal court decisions interpreting that Act when faced with cases brought under the North Carolina legislation.2 9 Indeed, several states having similar statutes have held
the federal interpretations to be incorporated into their statutes, either
explicitly by legislative provision,30 or through judicial construction. 31
And the North Carolina Supreme Court indicated in Hardy that it too
would at least look to the federal opinions for "[s]ome guidance"
when construing section 75-1.1.32 On the judge or jury question, however, the court conceded that FTC cases involving administrative rather
than jury determinations on the issue of unfair trade practices are not
"directly in point." 33 Policy considerations appropriate in the administrative agency context clearly differ from those important to an
appreciation of the jury's role in the judicial process.34
Nevertheless, the North Carolina Supreme Court did rely heavily
upon the United States Supreme Court and lower federal court opinions
which had held that judicial construction of the meaning of the phrase
"deceptive trade practices" is to be given priority over Federal Trade
Commission rulings.3 5 Because administrative agencies possess a
special expertise, they are "often in a better position than are courts
to determine when a practice is 'deceptive' within the meaning of the
pose to forbid a list of specified practices, and several states have adopted similar lists
in their consumer statutes. See note 88 infra.
27. See generally Comment, supra note 2.
28. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (1970) provides: "Unfair methods of competition
in commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in commerce, are declared unlawful."
29. Comment, supra note 2, at 910.
30. E.g., Commonwealth v. DeCotis, - Mass. -, 316 N.E.2d 748 (1974).
31. E.g., Commonwealth v. Monumental Properties, Inc., - Pa. -, 329 A.2d 812
(1974).
32. 288 N.C. at 308, 218 S.E.2d at 345.
33. Id. at 309, 218 S.E.2d at 346.
34. See note 41 and accompanying text infra.
35. 288 N.C. at 308, 218 S.E.2d at 345, citing FTC v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 380
U.S. 374 (1965); FTC v. Keppel & Bro., Inc., 291 U.S. 304 (1934); Firestone Tire &
Rubber Co. v. FTC, 481 F.2d 246 (6th Cir. 1973); and Wisdom v. Norton, 507 F.2d
750 (2d Cir. 1974).
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[Federal Trade Commission] Act."30 Agency judgments therefore are
to be given extensive weight by reviewing courts before they are
rejected.3 7 But, "in the last analysis the words 'deceptive practices' set
forth a legal standard . . . ."I
Thus it is for appellate courts to
correct administrative errors in statutory interpretation or application.""

Turning from the national model, the North Carolina Supreme Court
must have then reasoned that the fact-law distinction of the federal
analogy should translate into a judge/jury distinction in state court
litigation.

40

It would seem that not only do the federal cases serve as poor
analogies, but also that the court in Hardy unnecessarily enmeshed
itself in the fact-law dichotomy which has so confounded numerous
courts and commentators in the past. 41 It has been submitted that this
classification is nothing more than shorthand for a choice by the courts
of a particular standard of review. 42 Since the scope of review is
thought to differ depending upon the "label" applied, 43 courts unwill-

ing to review administrative decisions "are tempted to explain by the
easy devise of calling the question one of 'fact'; and when otherwise disposed, they say it is a question of 'law.' "" If then freedom of review

is the real goal, whether it is sought to avoid problems of delegation
36. See, e.g., FTC v. Beech-Nut Packing Co., 257 U.S. 441, 453 (1922), in which
the Court declared that "[tihe Commission, in the first instance, subject to the judicial
review provided, has the determination of practices which come within the scope of the
act."
37. The federal statutory scheme depends primarily upon agency expertise for effective enforcement:
It [the FTC] was created with the avowed purpose of lodging the administrative functions committed to it in "a body specially competent to deal with them
by reason of information, experience and careful study of the business and economic conditions of the industry affected," and it was organized in such a manner, with respect to the length and expiration of the terms of office of its members, as would "give to them an opportunity to acquire the expertness in dealing
with these special questions concerning industry that comes from experience."
FTC v. R.F. Keppel & Bro., Inc., 291 U.S. 304, 314 (1934), quoting SENATE COMm.
ON INERsTATE COMMERCE, S. Doc. No. 597, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 9-11 (1914).
38. FrC v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 380 U.S. 374, 385 (1965).
39. FTC v. Curtis Publishing Co., 260 U.S. 568, 579-80 (1972); FTC v. Gratz,
253 U.S. 421, 427 (1920).
40. 288 N.C. at 309, 218 S.E.2d at 346.
41. See, e.g., NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111 (1944); NLRB v.
Marcus Trucking Co., 286 F.2d 583 (2d Cir. 1961); O.W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW
(1851); Weiner, The Civil Trial Jury and the Law-Fact Distinction, 54 CALiP. L. Rnv.
1867 (1966).
42. L. GREEN, Jtxm AND JURY 279 (1930).
43. W. GELLHoRN & C. BYsE, AnmimSrRATrvE LAW 380 (5th ed. 1970).
44. J. DIcKINsoN, ADMINiSTRATIVE JUSTICE AND THE SUPREMACY OF LAW IN THa
UNrrED STATES 55 (2d ed. 1955).
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and separation of powers,4 5 or merely to extricate appellate courts from
the limitations upon judicial review imposed by the "substantial evidence" rule,46 resolutions of the fact-law debate in the field of adminis-

trative law cast little light on an analysis of the proper functions of judge
and jury in a civil case.
The North Carolina Supreme Court also noted that legislation

similar to section 75-1.1 had recently been interpreted by the courts
of other states.4 7 Unfortunately, the court chose to focus its attention
on Massachusetts cases which, arising in equity, "did not specifically
address . . . the division of function between judge and jury in determining whether a violation had occurred. 4 8 Furthermore, it seems
that the cases cited are better read as announcing reasons for setting
aside4 ' or directing5" verdicts, than as declaring any policy on the judge

or jury allocation. And most of the decisions from other jurisdictions
in which similar legislation was involved are likewise of little value on
the judge/jury issue, either because they too arose in equity,51 or

because the particular statute more specifically spelled out the conduct
52
proscribed.
45. Although for many years the courts had resisted legislative attempts to delegate
legislative and "executive" power to administrative agencies, when the substantive due
process era came to an end, so in large measure did the courts' resistance to delegation.
Consistent with principles of separation of powers, courts today will not interfere with
agency determinations made within their delegated authority. See L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL
CONTROL OF ADMrs-RA TIVE AcTroN 28-86 (1965). By the single expedient of
calling a particular conclusion a finding of fact, the court in many cases will have
avoided a potential confrontation with separation of powers concepts.
46. Since ICC v. Union Pac. R.R., 222 U.S. 541 (1912), the United States Supreme Court has insisted that agency rulings are not to be displaced unless unsupported
by "substantial evidence." Id. at 547-48. The effect of this rule is to preclude courts
from an extensive review of agency findings, at least those that are classified as "of
fact."
47. 288 N.C. at 308, 218 S.,E.2d at 346. See cases cited note 88 infra.
48. 288 N.C. at 308, 218 S.E.2d at 346.
49. Commonwealth v. DeCotis, - Mass. -, 316 N.E2d 748 (1974). The North
Carolina Supreme Court seems to have misinterpreted this Massachusetts opinion: the
quoted language (288 N.C. at 308, 218 S.E.2d at 346) simply reaffirms that plaintiff's
judgment will be overturned only if as a matter of law defendant should have had a directed verdict even before the case was presented to the trier of fact. See text accompanying note 20 supra.
50. PMP Associates, Inc. v. Globe Newspaper Co., - Mass. -, 321 N.E.2d 915
(1975). Again, the North Carolina Supreme Court may have misread the Massachusetts decision, which did no more than sustain defendant's demurrer in the lower
court. Clearly, courts can, as a matter of law, exempt certain practices from statutory
attack if they are in no way "immoral, unethical, oppressive nor unscrupulous." Id. at
918.
51. E.g., State ex rel. Danforth v. Independence Dodge, Inc., 494 S.W.2d 362 (Mo.
App. 1973).
52. E.g., Crawford Chevrolet, Inc. v. McLarty, 519 S.W.2d 656 (Tex. Civ. App.

1975).
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Significantly, the North Carolina Supreme Court had previously
held in Carolina Aniline & Extract Co. v. Ray 3 that "'[unfair competition is a question of fact. The universal test question is whether
the public is likely to be deceived."'" Although phrased in factlaw terminology, it is clear that the court envisioned a definite jury
function. While Carolina Aniline was decided on a common-law
unfair competition claim some years before the enactment of section
75-1.1, the juxtaposition of the terms "unfair competition" and "unfair
trade practices" in that section evidences that the two concepts are of
similar import.55 The North Carolina legislation was drawn to encompass any unfair or deceptive practice, whether between a merchant and
his competitors or the merchant and his customers.56 Should not the
court, therefore, have given consideration to the jury preference
implicit in CarolinaAniline as precedent when evaluating the judge or
jury issue posed by section 75-1.1? The State of Washington, as did
North Carolina, patterned its consumer protection statute after the
FTC Act.51' Yet when given the opportunity to construe its legislation
in the context of a jury trial, the Washington Court of Appeals was
emphatic about the jury's role: "We believe that whether defendant's
conduct amounted to an unfair method of competition was a factual
question for the jury and instructing as a matter of law was improper."5 "
Instead of obfuscating analysis by couching its conclusions in the
language of the fact-law paradox, the court in Hardy v. Toler might well
have attempted to articulate the policies behind its decision to take from
the jury meaningful involvement in the application of section 75-1.1.
It has often been pronounced, for example, that statutory interpretation
is a function particularly within the special province of the courts."
53. 221 N.C. 269, 20 S.E.2d 59 (1942).
54. Id. at 272, 20 S.E.2d at 61, quoting 63 C.J. Trade-Marks, Trade-Names and
Unfair Competition § 112, at 414-15 (1933).
55. Section 75-1.1(a) reflects the parallel meanings of the two terms: "Unfair
methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any
trade or commerce are hereby declared unlawful."
56. Section 75-1.1 effectively overrules Rice v. Asheville Ice Co., 204 N.C. 768,
169 S.E. 707 (1933) (per curiam). On the federal level, the Wheeler-Lea Amendment
of 1938 had brought otherwise prohibited conduct within FTC jurisdiction by removing
the requirement of actual competition. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (1970).
57. WASH. Rnv. CODE ANN. § 19.86.020 (1974) provides: "Unfair methods of
competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce are hereby declared unlawful."
58. Ivan's Tire Serv. Store, Inc. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 10 Wash. App.
110, -, 517 P.2d 229, 238 (1973), afrd, - Wash. -, 546 P.2d 109 (1976).
59. See, e.g., NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 135-36 (1944)
(Roberts, J., dissenting); 2 H. HART & A. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS
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Such a pronouncement certainly has validity in relation. to judicial
definition of the broad parameters of legislative intent"0 or constitu-

tional review. 6' On the other hand, the United States Supreme Court
has frequently stated that agency determinations will not be overturned
unless clearly erroneous or unsupported by evidence. 62 And in Byrd

v. Blue Ridge Electric Cooperative, Inc.65 the United States Supreme
Court refused to allow a contrary state rule to prevent a jury from

determining if plaintiff were indeed an "employee" within the meaning
of South Carolina's Workmen's Compensation Act." Perhaps the factlaw distinction has again obscured "the real inquiry . . ., namely to
which decision-maker should the task of law application be entrusted,
and why."6' 5 It can be argued that Congress should allocate the job of

statutory application in administrative cases between courts and agencies to reflect respective expertise, or lack of it, in specific areas. 6

When the allocation must be between judge and jury, "[a] basis for
differentiation [might be] whether the issue involves a sensitive area

that warrants a 'popular' or 'communal' judgment. 6' 7 Moreover, just
as administrative rulings are generally considered to be competent as
long as the agency does not exceed its congressionally mandated

authority,66 legislative intent, if discernable, should dictate the proper
division of function between judge and jury when the application of

other statutes is at issue.
Since legislative intention on the judge/jury question is not clear
from the statute itself, 9 it must be inferred indirectly.

Although the

court in Hardy must have presumed a particular legislative preference,
IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAw 1345-47 (tent. ed. 1958); Brown, Fact and
Law in Judicial Review, 56 HRv. L. REV. 899, 904-05 (1943); Stern, Review of Findings of Administrators, Judges and Juries: A Comparative Analysis, 58 H. v. L. REv.
70, 105-07 (1944).
60. See, e.g., NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 120, 129 (1944).
61. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Monumental Properties, Inc., 10 Pa. Commw. Ct.
R. 596, 314 A.2d 333 (1973).
62. See, e.g., FTC v. Standard Educ. Soc'y, 302 U.S. 112, 117-18 (1937).
63. 356 U.S. 525 (1958).
64. Id. at 533-40.
65. Weiner, supra note 41, at 1873 (second emphasis added).
66. See note 37 supra.
67. J. COUND, J. FRIEDENTHAL, & A. MILLER, CIVIL PROCEDURE: CASES AND MATE-

RILS 686 (1968).
68. W. GELLHORN & C. BYSE, supra note 43, at 380-81, quoting REPORT OF THE
ATrORNEY GENERAL'S COMMITrEE ON ADMImSTRATIVE PROCEDURE 87-91 (1941).
69. Even the Attorney General conceded in his brief that section 75-16 "may be
taken by some as tending to indicate that the jury should find not only the facts but
also as to whether or not there has been a violation of the statute." Brief for Attorney
General as Amicus Curiae at 4.
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fuller consideration might well have yielded a different conclusion. In
addition to electing not to attempt a listing of all forbidden practices, the
North Carolina legislature also declined to establish a special agency
to administer the statute.70 Presumably the legislature also intended
to create a new statutory tort that would not simply subsume the
common-law action of fraud.7 1 Although not independently indicative,

taken together these choices would seem to support an inference of a
legislative bias for jury determinations.

The generality of the statutory

scheme necessitates that its prohibitions find specific meaning in its
application "to the facts of particidar cases arising out of unprecedented
situations. 7' 2 No administrative agency was created to assume this
responsibility.

Juries, however, are particularly adapted to ad hoc

decision making, and it has been contended that "courts should not take
it upon themselves to convert a deliberately flexible standard into something more concrete by preventing juries from determining the reasonableness of human conduct. ' 73 Juries are permitted to find "actionable
If then the gravamen of
fraud and deceit,I 74 as well as negligence.
this new statutory tort is unethical and unfair conduct,7 1 should not a
jury be allowed to find a deceptive trade practice as well? For as the
Hardy court admitted, deceptive trade practices amount in practical
effect to lesser included degrees of fraud. 77 And because section
70. See Comment, supra note 2, at 899.
71. The court itself reached this conclusion. 288 N.C. at 309, 218 S.E.2d at 346,
citing D.D.D. Corp. v. FEC, 125 F.2d 679 (7th Cir. 1942) and Garland v. Penegar, 235
N.C. 517, 70 S.E.2d 436 (1952).
72. The quotation is from the United States Supreme Court opinion in FTC v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 380 U.S. 374, 385 (1965).
73. Weiner, supra note 41, at 1904-05.
74. Garland v. Penegar, 235 N.C. 517, 519, 70 S.E.2d 486, 487 (1952).
75. "Even when the historical facts are undisputed, the jury rather than the judge
will normally decide whether they will be characterized as negligence." Weiner, supra
note 41, at 1876-77. Thus, in a negligence case it is the jury that makes the ultimate
determination of liability.
76. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-1.1(b) (1975).
77. 288 N.C. at 309, 218 S.E.2d at 346. Ironically, the court quotes with approval
from Garland v. Penegar, a case whose facts were virtually identical to those before the
court in Hardy:
"Plaintiff alleged and offered evidence tending to show that the defendant,
an automobile dealer, falsely and fraudulently represented that the automobile
then being sold him was a 'new demonstrator,' that it had been driven only
1,000 miles as the speedometer apparently indicated, and that the automobile
was in perfect condition. Plaintiff testified that instead of it being as represented the automobile was not a new one but had been previously sold to another person who drove it 8,000 miles and then turned it back to the defendant.
Plaintiff also testified the automobile was not in good condition, and that he
had incurred trouble and expense in repairs.
It is apparent from an examination of the record that the plaintiff offered

DECEPTIVE TRADE PRACTICES

1976]

75-1.1 was designed to accomplish more than a codification of existing

case law,78 it would not be appropriate to allow state judges to construe
the statute according to common-law concepts.

However, if the jury

is to have no role in determining liability under the statute, it is likely
that trial judges may continue to require proof of a common-law tort

in consumer actions."

Such a practice would undoubtedly frustrate the

legislative purpose of providing a potent statutory remedy for unfair or
deceptive trade practices.

In addition to the difficulties of discerning legislative purpose on
the issue, several other policies converge that must be reconciled before
deciding the judge/jury question. Foremost among these is the extent
to which "a fixed standard that applies to all members of the community impartially" is to be valued over an ad hoc determination that

better takes into account the peculiar circumstances of an individual
case.

0

The North Carolina Attorney General argued in Hardy, as

amicus curiae, that a consistent interpretation of section 75-1.1 was vital
both to insure uniform application on a state-wide basis, and to encourage private actions by providing "guidance. .. to both courts and attorneys for the future trial of such actions."8 " Implicit in such a position
must be the fear of a free-wheeling, plaintiff-consumer oriented jury,
especially when treble damages automatically accrue.82 Yet in Byrd the
United States Supreme Court rejected just such a contention as an insufficient justification for denying plaintiff the right to have a jury deter-

mine his status" in an analogous situation.
sufficient evidence to carry the case to the jury on the issue of actionable fraud
and deceit, and that defendant's motion for judgment of nonsuit was properly
denied."
Id. at 309, 218 S.E.2d at 346, quoting Garland v. Penegar, 235 N.C. 517, 518-19, 70
S.E.2d 486, 487 (1952). The net effect of the court's ruling on the judge/jury issue
in Hardy, therefore, is to deny that which plaintiff would have had prior to the passage
of section 75-1.1: a jury judgment on defendant's conduct. Surely it was not the legislature's intent to deprive consumer plaintiffs of the considerable protection already provided by the prospect of a jury determination in the fraud cases.
78. See note 71 and accompanying text supra.
79. The lower court judge in Hardy must have done so himself.
80. J. CouND, J. FRmDENTHAL, & A. MiLLER, supra note 67, at 685-86.
81. Brief for Attorney General as Amicus Curiae at 4.
82. It has been argued that a jury can effectively impose strict liability upon any
defendant brought before it, unless its function is severely controlled. See J. FRANK,
And courts are likely to be extremely reluctant to
COURTS ON TRuL 110-11 (1949).
let a jury find liability when any award it returns will be tripled. In this context it
is important to note, however, that whereas the Federal Trade Commission Act makes
no provision for private actions or treble damages, the North Carolina legislation provides for both, and in the context of a jury trial. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-16 (1975).
83. 356 U.S. at 538.
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Even were an extensive role assumed for the jury, the court would
in no way be displaced from an important supervisory function in the
administration of the statute. Certain specific practices, proven
through experience to be unfair, could still be declared deceptive by

rule of law. s4 Clearly, when such conduct is before the jury, courts
would be justified in directing a verdict for the plaintiff," or setting
aside a jury verdict clearly against the weight of common experience.8 0

For these purposes North Carolina courts should look to federal and
other state 88 decisions for "some guidance." But when confronted with
84. See note 50 supra.
85. See Commonwealth v. DeCotis, - Mass. -, 316 N.E.2d 748 (1974).
86. See PMP Associates, Inc. v. Globe Newspaper Co., - Mass. -, 321 N.E.2d
915 (1975).
87. Since the enactment of the North Carolina legislation, the United States Congress passed a federal odometer statute which makes it unlawful to sell any vehicle
whose actual mileage is not reflected on the vehicle's odometer. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1984,
1989 (1970). Several cases have recently been reported in which liability has been
found under these sections. Coulbourne v. Rollins Auto Leasing Corp., 392 F. Supp.
1198 (D. Del. 1975); Stier v. Park Pontiac, Inc., 391 F. Supp. 397 (S.D.W. Va. 1975);
Edgar v. Fred Jones Lincoln-Mercury, 383 F. Supp. 583 (W.D. Okla. 1974); Delay v.
Heam Ford, 373 F. Supp. 791 (D.S.C. 1974). In addition to suits brought under this
special statute, numerous cases have been decided under section 5 of the F.T.C. Act
which might reveal the potential scope of section 75-1.1. E.g., FTC v. Standard Educ.
Soc'y, 302 U.S. 112 (door to door selling practices); FTC v. Algoma Lumber Co., 291
U.S. 67 (1934) (product misrepresentations); Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. FTC, 481
F.2d 246 (6th Cir. 1973) (unsubstantiated product claims); Tashof v. FTC, 437 F.2d
707 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (bait & switch advertising); All-State Indus., Inc. v. FrC, 423
F.2d 423 (1970) (failure to disclose that a promissory note would be transferable to
a holder in due course, cutting off buyer's defenses); Montgomery Ward & Co. v. FTC,
379 F.2d 666 (1967) (misrepresenting warranties); Charles of the Ritz Distribs. Corp.
v. FTC, 143 F.2d 676 (2d Cir. 1944) (deceptive advertising); Fresh Grown Preservo
Corp. v. FTC, 125 F.2d 917 (2d Cir. 1942) (labeling).
88. The North Carolina legislature has also enacted an odometer statute since the
commencement of the litigation in Hardy, which provides that its violation constitutes
an unfair trade practice under section 75-1.1. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-349 (1975). The
legislature has added further definition to the provisions of section 75-1.1 through the
passage of id. § 25A-44(a) (Cum. Supp. 1975), the Retail Installment Sales Act, which
declares that a violation of that section also violates section 75-1.1.
Furthermore, other conduct has been recognized to be unfair under the deceptive
trade practices legislation of several states. See, e.g., Scott Imports v. Orton, 27 Ariz.
App. 354, 527 P.2d 513 (1974) (turning back odometer); Nash v. Hoopes, 332 A.2d
411 (Del. Super. Ct. 1975) (failure to disclose existing mortgage default and impending
foreclosure); In re Brandywine Volkswagen, Ltd., 306 A.2d 24 (Del. Super. Ct. 1973)
(misrepresenting condition of automobile); Slaney v. Westwood Auto, Inc., - Mass. -,
322 N.E.2d 768 (1975) (automobile); PMP Associates, Inc. v. Globe Newspaper Co.,
- Mass. -, 321 N.E.2d 915 (1975) (refusal to accept newspaper advertising not a violation); Commonwealth v. DeCotis, - Mass. -, 316 N.E.2d 748 (1974) (resale fee
without furnishing services); State ex rel. Danforth v. Independence Dodge, Inc., 494
S.W.2d 362 (Mo. App. 1973) (automobile); Brown v. Lyons, 43 Ohio Misc. 14, 332
N.E.2d 380 (Hamilton County C.P. 1974) (failure to honor warranties, misrepresentation of product qualities, failure to provide prior written estimates of repairs); Commonwealth v. Monumental Properties, Inc., - Pa. -, 329 A.2d 812 (1974) (terms in
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new and unique circumstances, the courts should give a jury the first
chance to pass on the "fairness" of the defendant's actions. Perhaps
the standard for a jury instruction on the meaning of "unfair and deceptive" practices should be that proposed by the court in CarolinaAniline: "Whether the public is likely to be deceived."8 9 Although less
freely reviewable, a jury finding in such a case would be supported by
the weight of a community judgment on a sensitive public issue.
Furthermore, rather than hampering the instigation of private actions
to enforce the statute, the prospect of a jury verdict would seem to encourage such actions. Indeed, if section 75-1.1 is to fulfill its promise,
a jury drawn from the consuming public must be given a substantial
involvement in the denunciation of unfair or deceptive trade practices.
The North Carolina Supreme Court need not be deterred from a
thorough reconsideration of the judge/jury question by its decision in
Hardy v. Toler. For the court in Hardy did no more than refer to the
historical functions of judge and jury, assuming without further analysis
that they were to be grafted into the statutory scheme of section
75-1.1. The ultimate disposition of the case, however, did not itself
depend upon a resolution of this issue, for even had the court decreed
a major role for the jury in determining liability under the statute in
future cases, a directed verdict was clearly dictated by the facts of this
case. In the face of defendant's stipulations, no reasonable jury could
have been allowed to find otherwise than that the statute had been violated. As a consequence, the court should feel free to undertake an
independent evaluation of the differing policies at issue before restricting itself to a superficial resolution of the judge/jury question. Hardy
need not be directly overruled; it certainly should continue to serve as
a declaration that the specific acts therein alleged constitute deceptive
trade practices as a matter of law. But as suggested above, the better
reasoned analysis on the more critical judge or jury issue must result
in a significant role for the jury in deciding whether particular conduct
amounts to an unfair or deceptive trade practice if the North Carolina
legislation is to have any real impact.
JAMES

MCGEE PHILLIPS, JR.

an agreement); Crawford Chevrolet, Inc. v. McLarty, 519 S.W.2d 656 (Tex. Civ. App.
1975) (misrepresentation of agent's authority). See also People v. Jack Dykstus Ford,
Inc., 52 Mich. App. 337, 217 N.W.2d 99 (1974) (violation of odometer statute).
89. 221 N.C. at 272, 20 S.E.2d at 61.

